CHAPTER V.
THE ACTION OF LE GATEAU. WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 26.I.
General Situation at Dawn.
(See Maps 1 and 5 and Sketch B.)
There is no doubt that the German Army had followed close on the heels of General Sir H.Smith-Dornen's
Corps and that the pursuers halted in fairly close contact with it.
This fact, coupled with the difficulty that the very scattered Cavalry Division would experience in
covering any further withdrawal and the obvious exhaustion of the three Divisions now halted on the
line Le Cateau-Caudry—Haucourt, had made it quite clear to the Corps Commander on the spot that,
unless his troops could continue the retirement during the night, a serious action could not
be avoided without running too great a risk of jeopardising the safety of the whole B.E.F.
That further immediate withdrawal was quite out of the question was settled at a conference held
at 2 am. at Corps H.Q. at Bertry. Shortly after dawn it also became certain that no co-opera tion
could be expected from the First Corps, which, as well as being behind time, had had a very disturbed night,
its further retreat being complicated by the presence of Germans at the edge of the Forest of Mormal on the
left bank of the Sambre.
Consequently in the early morning the G.O.C. Second Corps issued orders for his whole available force to
take up a position on the line Le Cateau—Quarries--Moulin d'Esnes, and this position was to be held at all costs.
11. THE BATTLEFIELD (See Map 5)
From Flank to Flank, from the big spur to the north-east of Le Cateau
on the one hand, through Troisvilles. Audencourt, and Caudry, to Esnes on the other, the selected position
measured about thirteen miles. This was to be held by the Fifth, Third, and Fourth Divisions.
The Fifth Division on the right, holding from Le Cateau spur to Troisvilles (both inclusive)
about four and a half miles ; the-Third Division in the centre, from Troisvilles (exclusive)
to Caudry (inclusive) about four miles ; and the Fourth Division on the left, from Caudry (exclusive)
to Esnes (inclusive) about four and a half miles.
The Battlefield is situated in the chalk
country of Northern France, though between Le Cateau and Cambrai the chalk really forms the
foundation and only crops out in the valleys, where the overlying strata have been removed by the
action of the streams. The greater part of the field is covered with a fine grained yellow loam,
its depth varying from a mere coating to a layer several feet thick, it is generally regarded as wind-borne,
in other words a dust. Wherever it was encountered it probably proved easy to dig in, even with the 'grubber.
At the time of the action the district was covered principally with corn-fields, but the corn was nearly all
cut and stood in the fields in stooks; whilst scattered over the open but undulating landscape were patches
of beet and. clover-fields. The only restriction to the free movement of all arms was an occasional wire fence.
A feature of the landscape near the centre was a solitary, tall tree standing on the south bank of the hollow
road to the east of Troisvilles (the Arbre of the 1/80,000 map). As this landmark would have been of use to the enemy,
an unsuccessful attempt was made to-cut it down before the action opened, great care having to be taken that the
southerly wind did not cause the tree to fall into the cutting and thus prevent its. use as a lateral covered way. The trunk, however, proved to be too thick and it was only half cut through when firing opened.
Most of the roads were sunken where they crossed the spur, the cuttings being shallow trenches varying from three
feet to six feet in depth, in other words they were ready for occupation by troops on the defensive wherever
they happened to face in the re quired direction. Many proved suitable for use as communication trenches as well
as providing shielded points of vantage that could be employed as Observation Posts and Headquarters.
The rolling, billowy nature of the country and the numerous deep valleys, made the position one that was difficult
to defend, as an assailant could approach quite close to many parts of the line before his advance could be
observed and effective fire brought to bear on him.
The spur to the east of Le Cateau, once it passed
definitely into German hands, would facilitate the envelopment of the right flank and would endanger the retreat.
Whilst the occupation by the Germans of the long spur which runs to the north of the Warnelle Ravine must
prejudice the defence of the left .flank section of the line.
The villages situated on the field were strongly built.
They were calculated to give ample cover from field-gun shrapnel, a point entire ly in the German favour, but
there was no time to prepare those held by the II Corps to withstand the effects of a heavy bombardment with
high explosive:
Generally speaking the gun positions were more suitable for an assailant and particularly for
an assailant who happened to be in a crushing numerical superiority. His guns could unlimber at starting on a
wide arc where it was almost impossible to locate them and knock them out, except with Heavy Batteries—and
only two of the latter were available. Then having subjected the guns of the defence to a heavy converging
fire some of the German Batteries could close up, covered by the fire of the others, and from these forward
positions cover the advance of the rest of their artillery and prepare the final assault of their infantry.
But there were other grave disadvantage one was that both flanks of the position were in the air ; another
that the line of retreat for the Fifth Division—the Roman Road to S. Quentin— ran in a south-westerly direction
across the rear of the position and this would probably lead to tremendous confusion when the time came to
retire and troops, transport, and ammunition Columns all came crowding back on it at the close of the day.That
task and General Sir Horace Smith-Domen did not hesitate to take the responsibility in ordering its immediate
occupation.
Nevertheless, whatever its defects, it was necessary to hold the Le Cateau position at this juncture.
No further retirement could be made at the moment, for the pursuit of the German army had to be stopped once
and for all.
At any rate the position would be suffice for that task and General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien did not hesitate
to take the responsibility in ordering its immediate occupation.
III. THE OPPOSING FORCES.
The Second Corps and attached troops that came under General Sir I. Smith-Dorrien's command on August, were,
The Cavalry Division, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Divisions, and 19th Infantry Brigade.
In other words
-12 Cavalry Regiments,and 2 Squadrons Divisional Cavalry; 10 Infantrv Battalions with
246 guns; and
90 machine guns (at most)
On the German side, no less than four Corps of the I German Army have been
identified as being engaged at Le Cateau on August 26, the II, III, IV and IV Reserve ; and there were
probably two Cavalry Divisions.
Consequently the Germans had available for the action, at least
12 Cavalry Regiments, as well as
32 Squadrons, Divisional Cavalry;
102 Infantry Battalions (exclusive of Pioneers) ; with more than 600 guns ; and about 240 machine guns.
So far as any military undertaking can be made a matter of accurate forecast and calculation, the German
Army was certain to overwhelm the heavily outnumbered British Force that faced them undismayed on that
August morning, calm in the assurance that at least they would render a good account of themselves,
and glad they were to change the disheartening role of retreat for the active one of hammer.
As the result proves the Germans have little they can boast about concerning the achievement
of their desire on August 26.